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THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHAPTER 19 BINATIONAL
PROCEEDINGS UNDER NAFTA
JAMES HOLBEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
To provide some context for this article on the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), l a brief review of Chapter 19 is important.
It has been eight years since the beginning of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement (FTA),2 and three years have past since NAFTA
went into force.
II. HOW DID CHAPTER 19 COME ABOUT?
The context leading to the creation of Chapter 19 of NAFTA has to
do with trade in the early to mid-1980's between the United States and
Canada particularly, but also more generally under GATT.' Both the
United States and Canada had conservative political administrations. Brian
Mulroney was the Prime Minister of Canada and Ronald Reagan was
the President of the United States. They were good personal friends,
both conservatives and both Irishmen. Every time they talked to each
other, they would discuss trade disputes: cedar shakes and shingles, wheat,
pork, swine, lumber, etc. Many people characterized the trading rela-
tionship between the U.S. and Canada, which is the single largest bilateral
trading relationship in the world, as "hogs and logs," or "suds and
spuds. ' 4 At the Shamrock Summit in 1985, Brian Mulroney finally said,
and I paraphrase, "Ron, you know we're good friends! We've got to
cut this out. Even though we have so many things in common, we're
always fighting about these trade disputes. Can't we do something to
fix this?" He proposed the negotiation of a free trade agreement.
A free trade agreement had been tried several times before in United
States-Canada history. In fact, a free trade agreement had been passed
by the Canadian parliament in the early part of this century, but the
Canadian government which negotiated it fell on the basis of that agree-
ment. Thus, suggesting negotiation of a new free trade arrangement was
a courageous proposal.
* U.S. Section, NAFTA Secretariat, Washington, D.C. Mr. Holbein received his B.A. from
the Univrsity of California and his J.D. from the University of Arkansas. .
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (effective Jan. 1,
1994), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
2. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can. (effective Jan. 1,
1989), 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
4. For further information about this relationship see WILLIAM J. DAVEY, PINE & SWINE:
CANADA-UNITED STATES TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1949). William J. Davey is the
head of legal affairs at the World Trade Organization.
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Negotiations began in 1986. They were conducted under a fast-track
negotiating authority approved by the U.S. Congress that was to expire
at the end of the fiscal year in 1987.1 Under the U.S. Statute, notification
of the intent to negotiate a trade agreement had to go to Congress under
that Fast-Track authority by midnight of September 30, 1987, or the
negotiations could not go forward from there. 6 At the same time in 1986,
U.S. representatives were preparing for the meeting in Punta del Este,
Uruguay, which led to the initiation of the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiation under the GATT.
The U.S. negotiating objective in the GATT talks was to get the biggest
agreement possible, and to cover subjects that had been traditionally left
out of GATT negotiations such as: agriculture, intellectual property,
services, and investment. Both the U.S. team and the Canadian team
would fight very hard for its country's best interests throughout each
part of the negotiation. At the same time, the teams were working toward
a win-win agreement and wanted to show the way for a broad agreement
among the parties of GATT.
One of the goals for the United States in that negotiation was to
eliminate Canadian domestic subsidies. Canada provided substantial pro-
vincial and federal government subsidization. In fact, Canada had a
regional development policy to provide subsidies to insure that the country
did not over-urbanize, and that there would always be people throughout
the country. However, about eighty percent or more of the population
is within twenty-five miles of the U.S. border.
One of the goals of the Canadian government was to eliminate U.S.
"contingency protection." Those are buzz words for eliminating or getting
a special exemption or waiver for Canada from the application of U.S.
unfair trade laws. Canada was specifically targeting the U.S. antidumping
and countervailing duties. Antidumping laws impose duties on goods that
are sold at less than fair value, and allow a country to raise the value
or price of goods to the price of market value of the goods in the
importing market.7 Countervailing duties offset unfair government sub-
sidies.'
The subsidies negotiation failed. There was no way the Canadian
government could accede to the U.S. demands that reduce its regional
subsidies. At the same time, the U.S. Congress would not have stood
for, and to this day would not stand for, the elimination of the unfair
trade laws, an exemption, or a waiver. This was true even for Canada,
in spite of the tremendous amount of political good-will for the Canadians
and the proposed agreement.
Two weeks before the deadline for the expiration of the U.S. Fast-
Track negotiating authority, the Canadians walked out of the negotiations.
5. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(1) (1993).
6. Id. § 2112.
7. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
8. Id. § 1671.
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The U.S. negotiating team worked day and night, literally, for weeks
prior to that. Over twenty chapters of the proposed agreement had been
negotiated. Everything was in place. Each chapter had been distilled down
to the point of making a few final decisions. However, contingency
protection and subsidies loomed as a real problem because the Canadians
had negotiated those issues in the media. The Canadians were vocal from
the beginning of the negotiations that they were going to eliminate U.S.
contingency protection. There was no way they could sign the agreement
without the assurance that they were going to have something arranged
to address the unfair trade laws. As a result, the Canadians walked out.
The chief U.S. negotiator, Peter Murphy, and a couple of other folks
were bemoaning the fact that the agreement was not going to happen.
The expiration of fast-track was three to four days from the deadline,
and it appeared as though we had failed. That night a call came through
to the Secretary of Treasury, Jim Baker, from Michael Wilson, the Finance
Minister in Canada. They took the issue to the next phase. They felt
that to close the deal it would be necessary to go beyond the negotiators
to the cabinet level. The Canadians needed to have assurances that the
agreement was going to stick. If they could get Jim Baker to agree to
the deal, they knew President Reagan would support the agreement and
get it through the Congress.
Literally, around-the-clock negotiations started. For the final negotia-
tions, the United States had Jim Baker and his team on one side while
the Canadians had Wilson and his team on the other. Each negotiator
would walk in and the group would negotiate a deal for each chapter.
The last chapter discussed was Chapter 19. The Chapter 19 people were
in the back room writing like crazy, trying to cobble something together
that worked for the Canadians.
The agreement needed to provide something for the Canadians to show
their public that they were benefiting from some form of contingency
protection. Chapter 19 was the political panacea for that. What it provided
was originally proposed by Sam Gibbons, who at the time was Chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee. His proposal had been
discussed a little bit, but there had been no working group that was
actually dealing with it. Prior to this proposal, dispute settlement was
the subject of Chapter 18. There really was not any concern for doing
anything broader in the dispute resolution area. His proposal just went
by the wayside. When the Canadians came back to negotiate in the last
three days of the talks, this proposal was turned into Chapter 19.
II. WHAT DOES CHAPTER 19 PROVIDE?
Chapter 19 confers contingency protection. It was intended to be
temporary and last only five years. It provides for binational panels of
trade experts from the United States and Canada to be convened for
each antidumping and countervailing duty determination or material injury
determination made by the relevant investigating authorities in each coun-
try on the other country's goods. Experts are drawn from rosters known
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for their objectivity and impartiality. These panels act in place of domestic
courts because in Canada, federal courts could review these sorts of
decisions. In the United States the Court of International Trade (CIT)
handles these disputes. Essentially, Chapter 19 carves out a piece of
domestic jurisdiction and gives it to a panel of experts who can make
binding decisions. Binational panels are not given injunctive authority
and therefore can not grant injunctive relief, but they can make a ruling.
that is as binding as a court decision on those determinations based on
domestic standard of review under domestic law.
Under the FTA, fifty-seven different matters have been considered up
to this time, five were under Chapter 18 which is outside of the scope
of this article, and fifty-two under Chapter 19. Thirty cases were filed
in the United States and nineteen in Canada. Three were extraordinary
challenges. Rules of procedure were prepared for the conduct of reviews.
These were amended on four different occasions. The last amendment
to the panel rules was made in February of 1994, and served as the
basis for the NAFTA panel rules. They were published in the Federal
Register,9 and the NAFTA rules came out February 23 of 1994.10
A code of conduct" was also created because it is necessary that panels
of experts act with objectivity and adhere to a very strict standard. This
is true both as to conflicts of interest and appearances of conflicts of
interest. For these purposes, a very rigorous disclosure system was created.
Panelists cannot be affiliated with one of the Parties, that is, one of
the governments; they must disclose their government contracts or rep-
resentation of the United States, Canada or Mexico. 12 Each partner of
a law firm has to make sure they are not representing anybody that may
be impacted by the decision. Panelists must be very careful not to be
representing other clients on issues that are under litigation before the
panel. In fact, issue conflicts caused a lot of problems for the Secretariats
because the subject had not been addressed adequately in the first Code
of Conduct. The administration of the Code of Conduct is the single
most important role that the NAFTA Secretariat plays by serving as the
"clerk of the court" for this system. Secretariats under NAFTA act as
the institutional memory by default, because each one of the panels is
ad hoc by its very nature. Some of the panelists may have had experience
but in many cases they have not. Therefore, the experience level of the
panelists varies each time one is put together.
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) elects U.S. pa-
nelists; and corresponding ministries in Canada and Mexico appoint
panelists from their countries. The national sections of the Secretariat
have no responsibility under Chapter 19 for antidumping or countervailing
duty matters until requests for panel reviews are filed. Then, the NAFTA
9. 59 Fed. Reg. 8702-01 (1994).
10. 59 Fed. Reg. 8686 (1994).
11. 59 Fed. Reg. 8720 (1994).
12. Id.
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Secretariat coordinates the selection of the panel with the USTR; that
is, the Secretariat sends documents to the roster members, receives them
back and forwards them to USTR, where the selection is made.
After the Secretariat is notified as to who is going to sit on a particular
panel, USTR's involvement ends. The NAFTA Secretariat handles the
entire matter, including reviews of U.S. administrative agency decisions.
The NAFTA office in Ottawa handles Canadian appeals, and there is a
Secci6n Mexicana [Mexican section] in Mexico City, which handles all
appeals from determinations of the Secretarfa de Comercio y Fomento
Industria 3 (SECOFI).
The United States and Canada have a bifurcated process for review
of antidumping and countervailing duty administrative decisions. First,
a decision is made by one of the agencies as to the existence of dumping
or subsidies. If the decision is affirmative, the issue of material injury
is reviewed separately by a different agency. Each of those decisions can
be appealed separately. Previously, the issues had to be appealed together
to federal courts in the United States. In Mexico, SECOFI makes both
the dumping or subsidy decision and then follows up with an injury
decision. Thus, panels in Mexico will generally have twice the work than
a panel in the United States
A very important part of what we do concerns the standard of review.
Each country has a standard of review that is spelled out in Chapter
19, and they differ significantly from each other. 4 The standard in the
United States is based on substantial evidence on the record, and the
agency's decision must be made in accordance with the law.' 5 In Mexico,
the standard of review is set out in Article 238 of the "C6digo Fiscal
de la Federaci6n'9 6 [Federal Fiscal Code], based solely on administrative
record. In Canada, the standard of review involves the application of
principles of natural justice and fair play, a much more equitable view
of things. Although it looks like due process, it is not exactly application
of due process as we think of it in the United States. Thus, the standard
of review is distinct for each country.
The extraordinary challenge committee is also important. If a panel is
accused of impropriety, its decision may be appealed to an extraordinary
challenge committee. Such a challenge may only be initiated by one of
the governments, not by one of the private parties. There is no further
review, with the exception of constitutional issues in the United States. 7
The governments have to allege one of three grounds: first, that there
has been panel misconduct. That would include bias, misconduct, a bribe,
something really exceptional by a panelist. A second ground is that they
13. Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development.
14. NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1911, 32 I.L.M. at 693.
15. Id. See also, Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a) (1983 & Supp. 1996).
16. D.O., 31 de diciembre de 1981.
17. A special process has been put into place for review of constitutional issues only by the
courts of the United States. There has been some criticism by Mexican attorneys that there is no
process for review of constitutional issues under the Mexican Constitution.
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have had a gross procedural error. The third ground is an allegation
that the panel acted in excess of its authority. A clause was added to
NAFTA that specifically addressed failure to apply the standard of
review, 18 because that was the claim made in all three challenge committees
under the FTA, that they had failed to properly apply the standard of
review.
The party challenging a panel decision must also demonstrate before
the extraordinary challenge committee that the errors alleged by the
government materially affect the panel decision. In my opinion, if a
government is complaining about the decision, this demonstrates material
effect by itself. The third hurdle is the most important one; the decision
has to threaten the integrity of the binational panel review process. None
of the extraordinary challenge committees reversed or sent back a panel
decision, however, the committees are moving a little closer to it.
There have been some controversial decisions, three in particular. One
involved pork; 19 one involved live swine;2° and the third involved lumber, 21
all from Canada. These issues have been categorized as "hogs and logs,"
or "pine and swine." In the first extraordinary challenge case involving
a decision by the U.S. International Trade Commission on Fresh, Chilled,
or Frozen Pork from Canada, the committee dismissed the U.S. claims,
stating that the United States had not come close to meeting the standard
of review required. The second extraordinary challenge committee reviewed
the decision of a panel which had remanded a decision of the U.S.
International Trade Administration involving live swine from Canada for
further proceedings. There was a very vigorous dissent by the chairman,
and the extraordinary challenge committee in their review of that decision
castigated the panel for not trying to find more evidence on the record
to support what the agency had done. Essentially, the majority of the
committee said, "You haven't gone so far that we need to take action
and step in, but we can see perhaps in the future that there might be
a heed for that by another committee."
The third committee reviewed the decision of a panel in which the
majority, consisting of three Canadians, essentially required the U.S.
International Trade Administration to revoke a countervailing duty order
on Softwood Lumber from Canada. The two Americans on the panel
wrote a vigorous dissent. It went before a three-member extraordinary
challenge committee. Two Canadians affirmed the panel decision, and
the American dissented. The shrillness of the dissent greatly diminished
the force of the argument.
III. CONCLUSION
This process is still in its toddler stage, and we are going to have to
see how it evolves over time. The procedures furnish expeditious, efficient
18. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 19, art. 1904 § 13(a)(iii), 32 I.L.M. at 683.
19. In re Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1859 (ECC 1991).
20. In re Live Swine from Canada, 15 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2025 (ECC 1993).
21. In re Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Canada, No. ECC 94-1904-01 USA (ECC Aug.
3, 1994).
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and low cost review of government agency decisions. I think we provide
the services we are intended to provide. Meanwhile, the jury is out as
to how effective this system will be in the very long term.

